Insurer Prejudice Analysis of an Expanding Doctrine in Insurance Coverage Law by Suter, Richard L.
Maine Law Review 
Volume 46 Number 2 Article 4 
June 1994 
Insurer Prejudice Analysis of an Expanding Doctrine in Insurance 
Coverage Law 
Richard L. Suter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, Contracts Commons, and the Insurance Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard L. Suter, Insurer Prejudice Analysis of an Expanding Doctrine in Insurance Coverage Law, 46 Me. 
L. Rev. 221 (1994). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol46/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
INSURER PREJUDICE: ANALYSIS OF AN
EXPANDING DOCTRINE IN INSURANCE
COVERAGE LAW
Richard L. Suter*
I. INTRODUCTION
All contracts of insurance place certain requirements on the in-
sured both before and after a covered loss has occurred.1 For exam-
ple, all insurance policies require that an insured notify the insurer
of a covered loss and cooperate with the insurer in the investigation
of the loss and in the pursuit or defense of any claims arising out of
the loss. Traditionally, if an insured failed to comply with such noti-
fication or cooperation requirements, the insurer could flatly deny
coverage of the claim.2 Recently, however, an increasing number of
courts are requiring that the insurer show that it has been
prejudiced in some way before it can deny coverage for the insured's
failure to comply with such requirements.2 This requirement of
showing prejudice will be referred to in this article as the insurer
prejudice rule.
In Maine, the insurer prejudice rule was first recognized in a lim-
ited context in 1985.' The application of the insurer prejudice rule
in Maine remained limited until the Maine Supreme Judicial Court,
sitting as the Law Court, suggested in Marquis u. Farm Family In-
surance Company5 that the rule must be applied in all situations
where an insurer has denied coverage based on the insured's failure
to comply with any procedural requirement placed on the insured
by the insurance policy.6 Although placing great limitations upon in-
surers, the broad application of the insurer prejudice rule, estab-
lished in Marquis, is justified both by public policy considerations
* Associate, Litigation Practice Group, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, Port-
land, Maine; B.S., United States Military Academy, 1984; J.D., Temple Law School,
1992.
1. See infra notes 55-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various
policy provisions which place procedural requirements on an insured.
2. See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the traditional
rule concerning denial of coverage for an insured's breach of such policy provisions.
3. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 28-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the initial rec-
ognition of the insurer prejudice rule in Maine. In Maine, the insurer prejudice rule
originated in and remains part of the common law. It should be noted that some
jurisdictions recognizing the insurer prejudice rule have codified the rule. See, e.g.,
M . CODE ANN. INS. § 482 (1993); 1977 MASS. AcTs ch. 437; Wms STAT § 631.81
(1980).
5. 628 A.2d 644 (Me. 1993).
6. See infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the expansion
of the insurer prejudice rule in Maine.
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and the principles of contract law concerning partial or immaterial
breach.7 These same principles which support placing the burdens
and limitations of the insurer prejudice rule on insurers, however,
also support certain contractual remedies which are not generally
recognized by the courts or pursued by insurers.8 Thus, in order for
the insurer prejudice rule to be equitable to insureds and insurers
alike, insurers must be permitted to take advantage of these
remedies.
Since the scope of the insurer prejudice rule appears to be ex-
panding in Maine and elsewhere, it is increasingly more important
for both insurers and insureds to understand the various aspects and
implications of the rule. This Article will provide an analysis of the
insurer prejudice rule, beginning in Section II with a discussion of
the definition of prejudice used when interpreting or applying the
rule. In Section III, the Article will examine the inception and devel-
opment of the rule in the State of Maine. Section IV will discuss the
various policy provisions to which the rule theoretically applies in
Maine and address certain issues of proof which have been associ-
ated with the rule. Three recognized exceptions to the insurer
prejudice rule will be discussed in Section V. The analysis will con-
clude in Section VI with a discussion of the rationales supporting
the rule and the potential insurer remedies which logically arise
from it.'
II. WHAT IS PREJUDICE?
In order to understand and apply the insurer prejudice rule, it is
essential to define the concept of "prejudice." An examination of
case law indicates that courts have failed to develop a broadly recog-
nized, comprehensive definition of the term. Many courts apply the
insurance prejudice rule without supplying any definition whatso-
ever for the concept. 10 Most courts, however, have developed a lim-
ited definition of prejudice which is based on and applied to the spe-
7. See infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ratio-
nales supporting the insurer prejudice rule.
8. See infra notes 108-121 and accompanying text for a discussion of insurer
remedies which should accompany the rule.
9. This Article will discuss the insurer prejudice rule only as it applies to post-
contract procedural requirements in insurance policies. The Article will not discuss
pre-contract procedural requirements to which a similar insurer prejudice rule is also
applied (i.e., most courts require that an insurer prove prejudice before it denies cov-
erage for the insured's misrepresentations or omissions on the application for insur-
ance). See Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. JMR Elecs. Corp., 848 F.2d 30, 32-33 (2d
Cir. 1988); Dukes v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1985); In re
Epic Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192, 1242 (E.D. Va. 1988); American Home
Assurance Co. v. Ingeneri, 479 A.2d 897, 899-901 (Me. 1984); Powell v. Time Ins. Co.,
382 S.E.2d 342, 350 (W. Va. 1989).
10. See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 409 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Mass. 1980);
Pickwick Park Ltd. v. Terra Nova Ins. Co., 602 A.2d 515, 518 (R.I. 1992).
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cific facts presented in the case before the court." A general
comprehensive definition of prejudice can be developed, however, if
the various cases applying the insurer prejudice rule are considered
as a whole.
Generally speaking, an insurer is prejudiced by an insured's
breach of a policy requirement when the purposes of the breached
policy requirement are defeated.12 Thus, to apply this comprehen-
sive definition of insurer prejudice, one must first understand the
purposes underlying the breached policy requirement. Since essen-
tially all procedural requirements placed on an insured in any given
insurance policy can be described as requiring some aspect of coop-
eration from the insured, the purposes of the various provisions sig-
nificantly overlap.13 As most reported case law deals with the notice
requirements in property and liability insurance contracts, these
cases are a good reference for understanding the general purposes
underlying procedural requirements which prescribe various aspects
of cooperation from the insured.
Courts have identified many purposes for notice provisions in in-
surance policies. Prompt notice allows the insurer to properly inves-
tigate14 and evaluate claims. Timely notification is essential because
of the evanescent nature of evidence. Locating witnesses, acquiring
physical evidence, and obtaining accurate testimony all become
more difficult with the passage of time.15 An insurer also requires
prompt notice in order to weed out fraudulent claims.10 As time
passes, fraud becomes more difficult to discover and prove. Timely
notification also allows the insurer to properly evaluate its position
11. See, e.g., Select Ins. Co. v. The Superior Court of San Diego County, 276 Cal.
Rptr. 598, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (concerning breach of notice require-
ment-prejudice occurs if the insurer would have acted differently had it received
timely notice); Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Monadnock Regional Sch. Dist.,
428 A.2d 894, 896 (N.H. 1981) (concerning breach of notice requirement-insurer's
lost opportunity to contact witnesses and obtain fresh, uninfluenced statements con-
stituted prejudice); Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v. Becton, 475 A.2d 1032, 1035 (RI.
1984) (concerning breach of notice requirements-insurer's inability to have the
claimant examined by a physician of his choice and to investigate the claim fully
amounted to prejudice); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davies, 310 S.E2d 167,
168 (Va. 1983) (concerning breach of cooperation clause-insured's failure to assist in
the preparation for trial and failure to attend the trial constituted prejudice).
12. See BARRY R. OSTRAGER AND THoAS I NEwmAN HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVEPAGE DsPums, at 98 (5th ed. 1992); Great American Ins. Co. v. C. G. Tate Con-
str. Co., 265 S.E.2d 467, 473 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
13. Indiana Ins. Co. v. Williams, 448 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)
("[c]ooperation clause provisions and notice provisions have the same purpose and
effect.").
14. See Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Murphy, 538 A.2d 219, 223 (Conn.
1988).
15. See Kolbeck v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 235 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Wis. 1975).
16. See, e.g., Steinbach v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 440 N.Y.S.2d 637, 642
(1981).
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and determine its rights and liabilities.17 The insurer requires early
control over a claim to explore the option of settlement' s and, if nec-
essary, to prepare an adequate defense. Prompt notice also allows
the insurer to maintain adequate reserves and establish more accu-
rate renewal premiums."" Finally, a fully informed insurer can take
steps to eliminate or reduce losses from similar risks in the future.20
This ability to control future losses would apply not only to the in-
sured who suffered the original loss, but to all other insureds with
similar loss exposures as well.
Insurer prejudice has been found to exist when one or more of the
purposes of the breached policy provision has been frustrated. For
example, prejudice has been found where:
1. The insurer was unable to properly investigate the claim;"
2. The insurer's ability to settle the claim was hampered;22
3. The insurer was unable to prepare an adequate defense;20 and
4. The insurer was unable to participate in decisions to adopt cor-
rective actions.24
As with cases dealing with notice requirements, courts have gener-
ally found insurer prejudice in cooperation clause cases in situations
where one or more of the purposes of the cooperation requirement
has been defeated.2 5 A cooperation clause generally requires the in-
sured to cooperate with the insurer in the defense of a claim or in
pursuing subrogation. It has been said that the purposes of a cooper-
17. D.C.G. Trucking Corp. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 440 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75-76 (1981).
18. Steinbach v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 440 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
19. E.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc.,
822 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1987); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 748
F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1984).
20. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 822
F.2d at 271.
21. Kermans v. Pendleton, 233 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (where
homeowner's insurer not notified of shooting until three years after incident, court
found insurer had no opportunity to physically examine victim or determine if there
were any viable affirmative defenses).
22. Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Monadnock Reg. Sch., 428 A.2d 894, 896(N.H. 1981) (liability insurer's inability to establish cooperative relationship with
claimant due to delay in notice recognized as factor in court's finding of prejudice).
23. See Ratcliff v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 735 S.W.2d 955, 958-59
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (auto liability insurer first notified of suit after default judgment
already entered).
24. Steelcase, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17028 (W.D.
Mich. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1990) (when insurer not notified of chemical
spill until two years later, court found insurer had right to approve and participate in
clean-up efforts and failure to comply with notice provisions materially prejudiced
insurers and released them from liability under the policies).
25. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davies, 310 S.E.2d 167, 168 (Va.
1983). But see United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Perez, 384 So. 2d 904, 905(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (even though purpose of cooperation clause was frustrated
by insured's failure to testify, court found no prejudice due to the fact that insured's
testimony could not possibly have been beneficial to the insurer).
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ation clause are, inter alia, to prevent any collusion between the in-
sured and a third-party claimant, to discover fraudulent claims, and
to avoid over-payment in cases of warranted claims.2 Although ex-
tensive case law does not exist concerning many other procedural
requirements found in insurance policies, the existence of prejudice
can likewise be determined by establishing the purpose for the spe-
cific policy provision and analyzing whether this purpose has been
frustrated by the insured's breach of the provision.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSURER PREJUDIcE RULE IN MA1N
Traditionally, in Maine, an insurer was able to flatly deny cover-
age of a loss if an insured failed to comply with a procedural re-
quirement contained in the insurance contract.27 In 1985, the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, issued its opinion
in Ouellette v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co. 2 18 In this case, the
insureds notified their uninsured motorist insurance carrier about an
automobile accident and their resulting injuries approximately four
years after the accident occurred.29 The insurer denied coverage for
the claim based on a provision in the insurance policy which re-
quired that the insureds notify the insurer "promptly of how, when
and where the accident or loss happened."30 In reviewing the propri-
ety of this denial of coverage, the Law Court recognized that pursu-
ant to the traditional rule, an insurer was not required to show that
it was prejudiced by an insured's unreasonable or unexplained delay
in giving notice.3 1 The Ouellette court commented that "[t]he the-
ory behind the traditional rule is that an insurance policy is a con-
tract and the delay in giving notice constitutes a breach of contract,
making the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer immate-
rial."32 The court noted, however, that other jurisdictions had aban-
26. Watson v. Jones, 610 P.2d 619, 624 (Kan. 1980); Rora.,Au H. LoNG, 2 THE
LAW OF LABILrry INSURANCE, § 14.01, at 14-3 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Whalen v. Equitable Accident Co., 99 Me. 231, 234-35 (1904) (failure
to comply with notice requirement); Heywood v. Maine Mut. Accident Ass'n, 85 Me.
289, 293 (1893) (failure to comply with notice requirement); Gates Formed Fiber
Products, Inc. v. Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 343,348 (D. Me. 1983)
(breach of cooperation clause); Wheeler v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 5 F.
Supp. 193, 197 (D. Me. 1933) (breach of cooperation clause). But see Camire v. Com-
mercial Ins. Co., 160 Me. 112, 122 (1964) (suggesting that some damage must result
for insurer to deny coverage for lack of cooperation); Medico v. Employers Liab. As-
surance Corp., 132 Me. 422, 427 (1934) (requiring substantial prejudice before insurer
can use the defense of non-cooperation of the insured against injured parties).
28. 495 A.2d 1232 (Me. 1985).
29. Id. at 1233. Essentially, uninsured motorist coverage provides an insured a
source of recovery should the insured become involved in an accident tortiously
caused by an uninsured driver.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1234.
32. Id.
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doned this traditional rule and were considering whether the insurer
had been prejudiced by the delay.33 The Ouellette court recognized
that the rationale for abandoning the traditional rule was that an
insurance contract was typically not a "negotiated agreement" but
rather a "contract of adhesion," with terms dictated by the insur-
ance company.3' The court recognized that the traditional rule
would often result in "an undeserved windfall to the insurer.''s
Based on its analysis, the Ouellette court adopted the rule that a
liability insurer must not only show that a notice provision was in
fact breached but also that the insurer was prejudiced by such
breach, placing the burden of proof on the insurer to establish
prejudice.36 The court also noted that the issue of prejudice was gen-
erally a question of fact.37
Two years later, in Lanzo v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co.,38 the Maine Law Court, applying Ouellette, ruled that
an insurer who failed to present any evidence of prejudice could not
deny coverage for its insured's breach of the notice requirements.3
This ruling reinforced the court's previous holding in Ouellette that
the burden of showing prejudice rests with the insurer. The Law
Court next addressed the issue of insurer prejudice in Maine Mu-
tual Fire Insurance Co. v. Watson.40 In this case, a property insurer
had denied coverage for a loss because the insured had not complied
with a policy provision that required that the insurer be provided
with a proof of loss within sixty days after the loss.' 1 The insurer
argued that this proof of loss provision was a condition precedent to
recovery for any loss under the policy.42 On review, however, the
Law Court held that coverage was appropriate in this instance, be-
cause, inter alia, the insurer "failed to show that it was in any way
prejudiced by the late filing of the proof of loss claim.' 4
Following Ouellette, Lanzo, and Watson, the insurer prejudice
rule appeared to be limited to notice and proof of loss requirements
only." The Maine Law Court, however, greatly expanded the scope
33. Id. at 1235.
34. Id. A "contract of adhesion" may be defined as a standard-form, printed con-
tract submitted on a "take it or leave it" basis. See, e.g., Dairy Farm Leasing Co. v.
Hartley, 395 A.2d 1135, 1139 n.3 (Me. 1978).
35. Ouellette v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 495 A.2d at 1235.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 524 A.2d 47 (Me. 1987).
39. Id. at 50.
40. 532 A.2d 686 (Me. 1987).
41. Id. at 687.
42. Id. at 688.
43. Id. (citing Ouellette v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 495 A.2d 1232 (Me.
1985)).
44. See Gates Formed Fibre Products, Inc. v. Imperial Casualty & Indem. Co., 702
F. Supp. 343, 348 (D. Me. 1988) (finding that Maine law did not require a showing of
[Vol. 46:221
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of the insurer prejudice rule in Maine through its 1993 decision in
Marquis v. Farm Family Insurance Company.5 In Marquis, the in-
sured had made a claim to his property insurer for damages arising
out of a fire.46 As a result of its initial investigation, the insurer re-
quested that the insured submit to an examination under oath and
produce documents relating to the claimed losses. 7 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the insured was indicted on two counts of arson by a grand
jury.4' The insured notified the insurer that he would not submit to
an examination under oath until the completion of the criminal pro-
ceedings.49 The insurer then rejected the insured's claim in its en-
tirety due to his failure to submit to the examination under oath as
required by the policy.50
In reviewing this denial of coverage, the Marquis court held that
the insurer was required to demonstrate prejudice as a result of the
insured's postponement of this examination under oath."' In addi-
tion to this specific holding on the facts of the case before it, how-
ever, the Marquis court also suggested that insurer prejudice must
be demonstrated before the insurer is relieved from its obligation to
cover a loss based on the insured's failure to comply with any proce-
dural requirement in the insurance policy.82 Therefore, following
Marquis, the insurer prejudice rule in Maine arguably applies not
only to notice requirements, proof of loss requirements, and exami-
nation under oath requirements, but also to any and all insurance
policy provisions that require the insured's cooperation in any way
or that are procedural in nature. 3 It should be noted that the grad-
prejudice before an insurer could deny coverage based on breach of a cooperation
clause in a comprehensive general liability policy).
45. 628 A.2d 644 (Me. 1993).
46. Id. at 646.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 649.
52. Id. at 650 (citing Pickwick Park, Ltd. v. Terra Nova Ins. Co., 602 A.2d 515,
520 (RLL 1992) and Bowyer by Bowyer v. Thomas, 423 S.E.2d 906, 910-11 n.9 (%V. Va.
1992)).
53. A discussion of Maine case law on the insurer prejudice rule would not be
complete without mention of a recent federal case on the topic. In State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lucca, CIV. No. 93-0082-B (Nov. 30, 1993), the United States
District Court for the District of Maine ruled that State Farm had no duty to defend
or indemnify its insured because twenty-two months had elapsed before the insured
provided State Farm with notice of an automobile accident. Id. at 3. To overcome the
insurer's burden of showing prejudice from the delay in notice, a State Farm investi-
gator testified that the delay made it impossible for State Farm to investigate either
of the vehicles involved in the collision, to interview witnesses while their memories
were fresh, or to do a prompt, independent medical examination of the claimant. Id.
Due to the fact that the insured offered no contradictory evidence on the issue of
prejudice, the court held that the issue could be decided in State Farm's favor as a
1994]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
ual expansion of the scope of the insurer prejudice rule in the State
of Maine reflects a national trend in this area of insurance coverage
law.54
IV. SCOPE AND DETAILS OF THE INSURER PREJUDICE RULE
A. Various Policy Provisions to Which the Insurer Prejudice
Rule Applies
The insurer prejudice rule in Maine now appears to apply when-
ever an insurer attempts to deny coverage based on the insurer's
breach of any procedural requirement or, in other words, any policy
provision that requires the insurer's cooperation in any way. It is
surprising to note just how many standard insurance policy provi-
sions fall within this description. Although there are procedural and
cooperation requirements placed on the insured in every type of in-
surance policy, for purposes of brevity, this Article will examine
three types of standard insurance policies: (1) a comprehensive gen-
eral liability insurance policy, (2) property coverage in a busines-
sowner's policy, and (3) a personal automobile insurance policy 5
The standard comprehensive general liability insurance policy
contains numerous procedural requirements which are primarily
found under the "Conditions" section of the policy. Under this sec-
tion the insured is required to allow the insurer to inspect its prop-
erty and operations at any time . 5 The insured must also allow the
insurer to examine and audit its books and records at any time dur-
ing the policy period.57 In the event of an occurrence, the insured
must provide written notice to the insurer "as soon as practicable"
providing the name and address of the injured party and of all avail-
able witnesses.58 If a suit is ultimately filed, the insured must "im-
mediately" forward the suit papers to the insurer.5  The insured is
required to cooperate with the insurer and, upon request, assist in
making settlements, conducting litigation, and enforcing any right of
matter of law. Id. at 4.
54. See BARRY R. OSTRAGER AND THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DispuTEs 63, 97 (5th ed. 1992); Charles C. Marvel, Modern Status of Rules
Requiring Liability Insurer to Show Prejudice to Escape Liability because of In-
sured's Failure or Delay in Giving Notice of Accident or Claim, or in Forwarding
Suit Papers, 32 A.L.R. 4th 141, 145 (1984); ROLAND H. LONG, 2 THE LAW OF LIABmLTY
INSURANCE 14-23 to 14-24 (1993).
55. All citations to standard insurance policy language are taken from SUSAN J.
MILLER AND PHILIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED
(1988). It should be noted that this treatise provides annotations and commentary to
the Insurance Service Office, Inc.'s standard property and casualty insurance policies
which are widely utilized in the American insurance industry. Id. at 1.
56. Id. at 409.
57. Id. at 410.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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contribution or indemnity. Specifically, the insured must attend
hearings and trials and assist in securing witnesses. The insured may
not voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation, or incur
any expense other than first-aid at the time of the accident.Y0 In the
event that the insurer makes a payment under the policy, the in-
sured is required to cooperate if a subrogation action is pursued.
The insured may do nothing after the loss to prejudice the insurer's
subrogation rights."" Finally, an insured may not assign its interest
under the policy without the consent of the insurer. 2
Concerning property coverage in a standard businessowner's pol-
icy, procedural requirements can be found in the "Common Policy
Conditions" section and also in the "Property Loss Conditions" sec-
tion of the "Property Coverage Form." Under these sections an in-
sured may not intentionally conceal or misrepresent any material
facts concerning the policy, covered property, the insured's interest
in the covered property, or any claims under the policy.03 The in-
sured must also allow the insurer to examine and audit its books
and records at any time during the policy period and up to three
years thereafter." The insured must allow the insurer to make in-
spections and surveys, accept reports on the conditions found, and
accept recommended changes. 5 In the event that the insurer decides
to pursue subrogation, the insured must cooperate.00 Rights and du-
ties of the insured under the policy may not be transferred without
the insurer's consent.67 An insured may not abandon property to the
insurer." If a loss occurs to covered property, the insured must com-
ply with the following requirements:
a. Notify the police if a law may have been broken.
b. Give the insurer "prompt" notice of the loss, including a
description of the damaged property.
c. Provide the insurer "as soon as possible" a description of how,
when, and where the loss occurred.
d. Take all reasonable steps to protect the covered property
from further damage.
e. At the insurer's request, provide a complete inventory of cov-
ered property.
f. Allow the insurer to inspect the property and to take samples
60. Id.
61. Id. Once an insurer makes payment to an insured under a policy, the insurer
is typically permitted to bring suit in the insured's name against any liable parties to
recover such payment. This is generally referred to as a right of subrogation. See M.
R. Civ. P. 17.
62. MIHAER'S STANDARD INSURANCE POLICMES ANNOTATED, supra note 56, at 410.
63. Id. at 484.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 507.04.
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of damaged property for inspection, testing and analysis.
g. Submit to an examination under oath if requested by the
insurer.
h. Provide the insurer with a signed, sworn statement of loss
within sixty days after request.
i. Cooperate with the insurer in the investigation or settlement
of the claim.
j. Resume all or part of the insured's "operations" as quickly as
possible."
Procedural requirements in the standard personal automobile in-
surance policy may be found in "Part E-Duties After An Accident
Or Loss" and "Part F-General Provisions." In these sections, an
insured is required to notify the insurer "promptly" of how, when,
and where an accident or loss happened. Names and addresses of
injured persons and witnesses must also be provided.70 The insured
must cooperate with the insurer's efforts in investigating, settling or
defending any claim or suit. Furthermore, the insured must
"promptly" send the insurer suit papers and submit as often as rea-
sonably required to physical examinations and examinations under
oath. Also, the insured must authorize the insurer to obtain medical
reports and other pertinent records and must submit a proof of loss
statement when required by the insurer.7 1 The insured may not vol-
untarily make any payment or assume any obligation, or incur any
expense other than first-aid at the time of the accident.7 2 If the in-
sured is making an uninsured motorist claim, the insured must
promptly notify the police if a hit-and-run driver is involved and
send the insurer copies of legal papers if the insured brings suit.7 8 If
seeking coverage for property damage to an automobile, the insured
must take reasonable steps after a loss to protect the vehicle from
further damage. The police must be notified if the vehicle is stolen.
The insured must permit the insurer to inspect and appraise any
damage to a covered vehicle prior to its repair or disposal.7 ' No cov-
erage is provided to insureds who make fraudulent statements or
engage in fraudulent conduct.7 5 Finally, insureds may not assign
their rights and duties under the policy without the insurer's written
consent.
7 6
As this brief outline of these three standard policies reveals, insur-
ance contracts place numerous and detailed procedural require-
ments on the insured. Based on the Maine Law Court's decision in
69. Id. at 507.04-507.05.
70. Id. at 10.1.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 10.2.
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Marquis, a Maine insurer could not deny coverage for the insured's
breach 6f any of the above-described or similar policy provisions un-
less the insurer could show that it was somehow prejudiced by the
breach. A mere showing that the insurer was forced to incur signifi-
cant additional costs as a result of the breach may not be sufficient
to meet this burden of showing that the purpose of the policy provi-
sion has been defeated by the insured's actions.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the issue
in great detail, it should be noted that the insurer prejudice rule has
also been held applicable to procedural and cooperation require-
ments in excess insurance policies and reinsurance contracts."
B. Standards and Manner of Proof
Maine law dictates that the insurer has the burden of proving not
only that the insured breached the procedural requirement in the
policy, but also that the insurer was prejudiced by such breach.7 8 A
placement of the burden of proof on the insurer in such instances
reflects the law of the majority of American jurisdictions.70 The ra-
tionale for placing the burden of proof on the insurer is two-fold.
First, the insurer is encouraged to make a prompt preliminary inves-
tigation once it is given a delayed notification of a claim. 0 Second,
because the insurer is an expert in investigating accidents, it is in a
much better position to determine whether it has been prejudiced
by any delay.81
In Maine, and elsewhere, the issue of insurer prejudice is typically
a question of fact.82 Some courts have held that under certain cir-
77. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 966 F.2d 628, 630 (11th
Cir. 1992) (notice requirement in excess insurance policy); Insurance Co. of Pennsyl-
vania v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 516, 524 (9th Cir. 1990) (notice require-
ment in reinsurance contract); Security MuL Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co.,
531 F.2d 974, 978 (10th Cir. 1976) (notice requirement in reinsurance contract); Olin
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 771 F. Supp. 76, 79 (S.D. N.Y. 1991) (notice
requirement in excess insurance policy).
78. Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644, 649-50 (Me. 1993);
Maine Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson, 532 A.2d 686, 688 (Me. 1987); Ouellette v. Maine
Bonding & Casualty Co., 495 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Me. 1985).
79. See BARRY R. OSTRAGER AND THoMAs R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES at 99-100 (5th ed. 1992). It should be noted that a minority of
jurisdictions hold that a breach of a procedural requirement in an insurance policy
gives rise to a presumption of prejudice which the insured then bears the burden of
rebutting. Id. at 100; see, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 771 F.
Supp. at 79.
80. See Great American Ins. Co. v. C. G. Tate Constr. Co., 279 S.E.2d 769, 775
(N.C. 1981).
81. Id. at 776 ("An insured would be in a far less enviable position if he had the
burden of showing an absence of prejudice. Indeed, the insured would be forced to
prove a negative.").
82. Ouellette v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 495 A.2d at 1235; Weaver Bro3.,
Inc. v. Chappel, 684 P.2d 123, 126 (Alaska 1984); Watson v. Jones, 610 P.2d 619, 626
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cumstances, the breach of the procedural requirement and ensuing
prejudice to the insurer can be presumed as a matter of law. 3 In
addition, it should be noted that some jurisdictions require the in-
surer to prove, in addition to prejudice, that the insured "willfully
and intentionally" violated the particular clause in the insurance
policy and that the insurer exercised "reasonable diligence" in ob-
taining the insured's cooperation.8' These additional items of proof
only appear applicable, however, in cases where the insured has
breached a liability policy provision requiring it to cooperate in the
defense of a claim.8 5
V. EXCEPTIONS TO THE INSURER PREJUDICE RULE
As with every good legal rule, the insurer prejudice rule has cer-
tain recognized exceptions. In fact, certain courts have recognized
three specific exceptions to the general rule: 1) the bad faith excep-
tion, 2) the entry of judgment exception, and 3) the claims made
exception.
In Great American Insurance Co. v. C. G. Tate Construction,"°
the Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed a situation where a
liability insurer denied coverage based on the insured's breach of the
notice requirement in the policy. 17 The court adopted the insurer
prejudice rule requiring that the insurer show prejudice to support
its denial of coverage. After adopting the insurer prejudice rule,
however, the court also immediately carved out an exception
thereto.
Lest this decision be perceived as encouraging dilatory tactics in
the notification of the insurer and, thus, as being unfair to insurers,
we also now impose the requirement that any period of delay be-
yond the limits of timeliness be shown by the insured to have been
in good faith. Anyone who knows that he may be at fault or that
others have claimed he is at fault and who purposefully and know-
ingly fails to notify ought not to recover even if no prejudice re-
sults. Equity dictates that a bad faith delay in notifying an insurer,
even though no material prejudice results, should bar the insured
(Kan. 1980); P. G. Bell Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 853 S.W.2d 187, 191
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
83. See, e.g., West Bay Exploration v. AIG Specialty Agencies, 915 F.2d 1030,
1037 (6th Cir. 1990) ("where the facts are so clear that one conclusion only is reasona-
bly possible") (citation in parenthetical omitted); Montgomery v. Professional Mut.
Ins. Co., 611 F.2d 818, 820 (10th Cir. 1980); see also, infra notes 91-95 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the entry of judgment exception to the insurer prejudice
rule.
84. Bowyer v. Thomas, 423 S.E.2d 906, 910-11 (W. Va. 1992).
85. See, e.g., id.; Watson v. Jones, 610 P.2d 619, 623 (Kan. 1980); Stumpf v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co., 794 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Davies, 310 S.E.2d 167, 168-69 (Va. 1983).
86. 279 S.E.2d 769 (N.C. 1981).
87. Id. at 770.
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from enforcing the policy.-
The court justified this exception on the general principle of con-
tract law "that implicit in every contract is the obligation of each
party to act in good faith."' 9 Since the concept of good faith is appli-
cable to all provisions in insurance policies, it can be reasonably as-
sumed that the bad faith exception to the insurer prejudice rule
would be applicable not only to breaches of a notice requirement,
but also to breaches of any other procedural requirement in an in-
surance policy.
The entry of judgment exception to the insurer prejudice rule has
been recognized by several courts.9 0 The entry of judgment excep-
tion is a limited exception to the insurer prejudice rule, as it applies
only to breaches of the notice requirement in liability policies. Es-
sentially, this exception dictates that insurer prejudice will be pre-
sumed in cases where an insured fails to notify the insurer of a
pending lawsuit against him until after a default judgment has been
entered. 1 It should be noted that prejudice is assumed to be present
"even though the option to fie a motion for a new trial is still avail-
able to the insurer. '92 The entry of judgment exception cannot be
relied upon, however, in cases where the insurer was on notice of the
pending suit through information supplied by other parties, even
though the insured failed to satisfy the notice requirements.03 Al-
though there do not appear to be any cases on the point, a logical
extension of this exception should be made to situations where de-
fault has been entered prior to the insured's compliance with the
notice provisions in the policy, and the insurer is unable to obtain
an order from the court lifting the entry of default due to the in-
sured's lack of good excuse for failing to timely respond to the
complaint.'
The third exception to the insurer prejudice rule is the claims
made exception. In Slater v. Lawyers' Mutual Insurance Co.,Ol the
California Court of Appeals ruled that the insurer prejudice rule
should not be applied to "claims made" policies 01 The Slater court
88. Id. at 776.
89. Id. (citing 17 AhL Jm . 2D Contracts § 256 (1964)).
90. See, e.g., Campbell v. Continental Casualty Co. of Chicago, 170 F.2d 669, 673
(8th Cir. 1948); Members Ins. Co. v. Branscum, 803 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Tex. CL App.
1991).
91. Members Ins. Co. v. Branscum, 803 S.W.2d at 466.
92. Id.
93. See P. G. Bell Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 853 S.W.2d 187,
192 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
94. See Porges v. Reid, 423 A.2d 542, 544 (Me. 1980) (requiring that (1) good
excuse for the default, and (2) likelihood of success on the merits both exist for an
entry of default to be set aside).
95. 278 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1991).
96. Id. at 483.
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recognized the inherent differences between "claims made" insur-
ance policies and "occurrence" policies.97
All professional liability policies were at one time occurrence poli-
cies. Underwriters soon realized, however, that occurrence policies
were unrealistic in the context of professional malpractice because
the injury and the negligence that caused it were often not discov-
erable until years after the delictual act or omission. In an effort to
reduce their exposure to an unpredictable and lengthy tail of law-
suits filed years after the occurrence they agreed to protect against,
underwriters shifted to the claims made policy.. . . This type of
policy differed materially from an occurrence policy in several as-
pects. Most notably, it was transmittal of notice of the claim to the
insurer which was the event that invoked coverage.a
Thus, under a "claims made" policy, coverage is triggered when no-
tification of a claim is made, as opposed to when the underlying ac-
cident or loss actually occurs, as is the case under an "occurrence"
policy. The court noted that applying the insurer prejudice rule in
situations of late notice involving a "claims made" policy would es-
sentially convert the "claims made" policy into an "occurrence" pol-
icy.99 Of course, the claims made exception only applies to situations
of delayed notice and would not have any application to an insured's
breach of other requirements of cooperation listed in the "claims
made" policy.
VI. RATIONALES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSURER PREJUDICE
RULE
A. Rationales for the Rule
There are essentially two basic rationales which have emerged in
case law which support the recognition of the insurer prejudice rule.
First, as was recognized by the Ouellette court, "[a]n insurance con-
tract is not a negotiated agreement, but rather . . . a contract of
adhesion, because the terms are dictated by the insurance company
to the insured .... 00 The Ouellette court further suggested that
under the traditional rule, which did not require a proof of insurer
prejudice, a forfeiture of coverage based on a breach of a procedural
policy requirement often resulted in "an undeserved windfall for the
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Pacific Employer's Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 3d
1348, 1357-58 (Cal. App. 1990)).
99. Id.
100. Ouellette v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 495 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Me. 1985);
see also Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 409 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Mass. 1980) ("The
only aspect of the contract over which the insured can 'bargain' is the monetary
amount of coverage.") (quoting Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193, 196 (Pa.
1977)).
[Vol. 46:221
INSURER PREJUDICE RULE
insurer." '0
The second recognized justification for the insurer prejudice rule
is the fact that it encourages compensation of accident victims. One
court has described the goal of liability insurance as extending "the
maximum protection possible consonant with fairness to the in-
surer." 10 2 Thus, by encouraging coverage, the insurer prejudice rule
supports this goal.
Insurance contracts are not purely private matters between insur-
ance companies and their insureds. Rather, there is a public inter-
est in... liability insurance contracts and that is the protection of
innocent victims of... accidents. This public interest would not
be deserved by a rule that denied an accident victim recovery
against the insurance company because it received late notice of
the accident, even though it suffered no prejudice as a consequence
thereof.103
Therefore, by placing the burden of showing prejudice on the in-
surer, courts have reasoned that coverage to both the insured and
the injured third parties will be maximized, and no undeserved
windfalls will be reaped by the insurer.
Another argument in support of the insurer prejudice rule, al-
though not generally recognized in case law, can be found in the
principles of contract law concerning partial or immaterial breach.
Procedural requirements in a contract were traditionally interpreted
as conditions to the insurer's obligation of performance under the
contract.104 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides for
continued performance of a contract, however, in cases when the
non-occurrence of a condition would cause disproportionate
forfeiture.
To the extent that the non-occurrence of a condition would cause
disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the non-occurrence
of that condition unless its occurrence was a material part of the
agreed exchange. 105
This section of the Restatement allows a court, in the appropriate
circumstances, to excuse a party's failure to perform a condition in
the contract if an inequitable forfeiture would occur. The court can
only excuse such a non-occurrence in situations where the condition
was not a material part of the contract. The insurer prejudice rule is
101. Ouellette v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 495 A.2d at 1235 (citing Brake-
man v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d at 196-97).
102. Oregon Automobile Ins. Co. v. Salzberg, 535 P.2d 816, 819 (Wash. 1975).
103. Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d at 198 n.8; see also Fox v. National
Savings Ins. Co., 424 P.2d 19, 23 (Okla. 1967); Bowyer v. Thomas, 423 S.E.2d 906, 911
(W. Va. 1992).
104. See supra, notes 27-31 and accompanying text for the discussion of the tradi-
tional rule.
105. REsTATEE NT (SECOND) OF CorAcrs, § 229 (1979).
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essentially an application of this principle. By excusing non-per-
formance of procedural requirements in cases where an insurer has
not been prejudiced, the court is essentially excusing the non-occur-
rence of an immaterial condition. If the insured's failure to perform
the condition did not result in prejudice to the insurer, the rule as-
sumes that the condition was not a material part of the insurance
contract.
B. An Insurer's Cause of Action for Damages for Non-Material
Breaches of the Insurance Contract
The insurer prejudice rule essentially dictates that a breach of a
procedural requirement in an insurance policy by an insured is not a
material breach unless it prejudices the insurer. An insurer, there-
fore, should be permitted to pursue any and all remedies which are
normally available in situations when a contract is immaterially or
partially breached. Comment 8 of Section 241 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts states:
A determination that a failure is not material means only that it
does not have the effect of the non-occurrence of a condition ....
Even if not material, the failure may be a breach and give rise to a
claim for damages for partial breach .... 100
Therefore, even if an insured's breach of a procedural requirement is
not material because the insurer has not been prejudiced thereby,
the insurer should not be precluded from pursuing an action against
the insured for damages for partial breach of the insurance contract.
There does appear to be some support for this proposition in case
law. In Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Associated International
Insurance Co., 10 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit examined a case where a reinsurer failed to cover a loss due
to the primary insurer's breach of the notice requirements in the
reinsurance contract. 10 8 The circuit court first applied the insurer
prejudice rule requiring the reinsurer to show prejudice before it
could deny coverage for the loss. 09 The reinsurer had claimed that
it was prejudiced by the lack of notice in that it was unable to estab-
lish a reserve for the loss and thereby obtain a tax deduction. 1 0 The
court ruled, however, that such inability to claim a tax deduction
did not constitute prejudice so as to relieve the reinsurer from its
liability under the reinsurance contract."' The court noted, how-
ever, that the reinsurance company was not precluded from collect-
106. Id.
107. 922 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1991).
108. Id. at 518.
109. Id. at 524.
110. Id. at 524-25.
111. Id. at 515.
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ing money damages to the extent that such damages were caused by
the insured's late notice.
112
The idea of an insurer's cause of action for damages for the in-
sured's partial breach of the policy is also supported in Colonial Gas
Energy System v. Uniguard Mutual Insurance Co.113 In that case, a
property insurer denied coverage for damages to one of the insured's
gas tanks, based on the insured's breach of the notice requirement
in the policy." 4 Prior to notifying the insurer, the insured had in-
spected, tested, and repaired the gas tank, and then refilled and re-
stored it to operation. " 5 The court held that the insurer was
prejudiced in that the insured had made inaccessible, if not nonexis-
tent, the only source of evidence which could have established the
insurer's sole defense on the merits of the claim." The court stated,
however, that it would defer entry of judgment in the insurer's favor
in order to give the insured an opportunity to submit to the insurer
an unconditional written offer of access to the damaged tank at the
insured's expense.11 7 It had been estimated by the parties that the
cost of emptying the tank would be between one and two hundred
thousand dollars.11 8 Thus, by allowing the insurer access to its tank,
the insured was allowed to eliminate, after the fact, the prejudice
which its breach of the insurance contract had caused to the insurer.
The substantial cost of emptying the tank, however, was placed with
the insured, as the cost was incurred as a proximate result of the
insured's breach of the insurance contract. Therefore, had the in-
surer paid to empty the tank in order to conduct an inspection prior
to covering the claim, arguably it would have had a claim for dam-
ages against the insured. Since the expense was necessitated by the
insured's breach of the notice requirement, the insurer would seek
to recover the costs incurred.
There will often be situations where the insurer, although unable
to establish prejudice, will incur significant costs as a result of the
insured's non-compliance with a procedural requirement in the pol-
icy. Theoretically, in cases where an insured breaches a procedural
requirement in a first party property insurance policy, and the in-
surer has been damaged but cannot prove prejudice, it could set off
the damages resulting from the insured's partial breach of the insur-
ance contract from the proceeds that are payable under the con-
tract. For example, if an insured failed to give notice of a loss to his
112. Id. (citing Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Century Casualty Co., 531 F.2d
974, 978 (10th Cir. 1976)).
113. 441 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
114. Id. at 767.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 769-70.
117. Id. at 771.
118. Id.
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property until after he had sold or otherwise disposed of the dam-
aged property, and the insurer as a result is required to hire an in-
vestigator to ascertain the location of the property, the insurer
should be able to offset the costs incurred in the search. This follows
because those costs resulted from the insured's breach of the notice
provision in the policy.
For liability insurers, a claim against the insured for a partial
breach of the insurance contract may be somewhat more difficult to
enforce, as a right of set-off may not be available.11 9 In such a situa-
tion an insurer would probably have to fulfill its obligations under
the policy and pay any amount owed to the injured party. Subse-
quently, the insurer would bring a separate action for damages
against the insured to recover the losses caused by the insured's par-
tial breach of the contract. For example, if an insured's failure to
cooperate with the insurer in defending a claim caused the insurer
to incur additional attorney costs or court imposed sanctions (per-
haps for the insured's repeated failure to attend a deposition or fail-
ure to respond to discovery requests), the insurer would have a
claim for damages to recoup these resultant costs, based upon the
insured's breach of the cooperation clause. As an alternative to a
suit for damages against its insured, a liability insurer could con-
sider the possibility of requiring the insured to pay a certain amount
of money at the inception of the insurance relationship which would
be maintained by the insurer in an interest-bearing account. Such a
fund would function similarly to a security deposit held by a land-
lord. If the insurer incurred costs as a result of the insured's partial
breach of a procedural requirement in the policy, the appropriate
amount would be deducted from the account. Finally, another alter-
native would be to simply reflect costs incurred by the insurer due
to the insured's partial breach in the premium charged during the
next policy period.
119. Depending on the wording of the policy, an argument might be made that an
insurer could set-off from the amount due the injured party any amount for damages
which were approximately caused by the insured's immaterial breach of a policy pro-
vision. Section 309 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states:
Except as stated . . . in § 311 or as provided by the contract, the right of
any beneficiary against the promisor is not subject to the promisor's claims
or defenses against the promisee or to the promisee's claims or defenses
against the beneficiary.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 309(3) (1979).
Sections 311(1-2) indicate that the promisor's duty to the beneficiary can be modi-
fied by the conduct of the promisee if the contract does not have a term prohibiting
such modification. Thus, any amount owed to an insurance contract beneficiary could
be modified by the breach of the insurance contract by the insured. Of course, al-
lowing such a set-off against the policy proceeds payable to the injured party could be
considered contrary to the above-discussed purposes of liability insurance, namely, to
provide as much coverage as possible without being unfair to the insurer. See supra
notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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A strong argument can be made that the recognition of such in-
surer remedies would be in the public's best interest. If such reme-
dies are not recognized, the overall effect of the insurer prejudice
rule may be to encourage loose compliance with or even general dis-
regard for the many insurance policy provisions to which the rule
applies. Such a result would not only be costly and inconvenient to
insurers, but also cause general disruption and inefficiency in insur-
ance relationships. Furthermore, if insurers are forced to bear the
extra costs caused by insureds who breach procedural requirements,
such costs will most likely be spread to all insureds in the form of
higher premiums. This result would be unfair to those insureds who
have strictly complied with their policies and have not caused their
insurers added and unnecessary expenses. Recognition of the above-
described remedies would also be fairer to non-breaching insureds,
as insurers would recoup costs only from those insureds who breach
their policies causing additional, unnecessary expenses.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Maine and elsewhere the insurer prejudice rule has rapidly be-
come an important concept in insurance coverage law. As has appar-
ently occurred in Maine, it is likely that other jurisdictions vi ulti-
mately apply this rule to all situations where an insured has
breached any procedural requirement or cooperation clause in an in-
surance policy. Although the rule is clearly justified, both by public
policy considerations and long-standing concepts in contract law, its
overall effect is unfair to insurers. Insurers should be permitted to
pursue remedies which are also justified by public policy and con-
tract law. By allowing insurers to recover costs incurred due to an
insured's non-prejudicial breach of a procedural requirement, the in-
surer prejudice rule would have a more logical and equitable effect
on both insurers and insurance relationships.
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